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Language, power and the social construction of animals 
Introduction 
There has recently been what Fairclough (1992:2) calls a ‘linguistic turn’ in 
social theory, where language is ‘being accorded a more central role within social 
phenomena’. Burr (1995:33), describing social construction, writes that ‘language itself 
provides us with a way of structuring our experience of ourselves and the world’. The 
role of language in power relations, particularly, has come under close scrutiny 
(Chimombo and Roseberry 1998, Van Dijk 1997, Fairclough 1989, 1992, Hodge and 
Kress 1993, Fowler 1991). 
Most of this work on language and power focuses on the role of discourse in 
oppression and exploitation. For example, the journal Discourse and Society is 
dedicated to ‘power, dominance and inequality, and to the role of discourse in their 
legitimisation and reproduction in society, for instance in the domains of gender, race, 
ethnicity, class or world religion’ (Van Dijk 2000).  
However, with rare exceptions such as Kheel’s (1995) discussion of the 
discourse of hunting, the role of discourse in the domination by humans of other species 
has been almost completely neglected. Power is talked about as if it is a relation 
between people only, for example, Fairclough (1992:64) describes the way that 
‘language contributes to the domination of some people by others’ (italics added). 
Despite the work of ecofeminists such as Adams (e.g., 1990) and Kheel (1993), 
whose aim is ‘exposing the underlying mentality of exploitation that is directed against 
women and nature [including animals]’ (ibid:243), sociology in general is only just 
beginning to consider domination as it applies to animals. Berry (1997:115) draws 
parallels between the ‘oppression of human minorities and nonhuman animals’, echoing 
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Spiegel (1997), who made what she called the ‘dreaded comparison’ between human 
and non-human slavery. However, such comparisons, while rare in sociological 
literature, form a fundamental part of the animal rights movement, and can be traced 
back at least to Singer (1990:6), who wrote ‘the fundamental objections to 
racism…apply equally to speciesism’.  
This paper attempts to apply theories of language and power which have been 
used in the analysis of racism, particularly Critical Discourse Analysis, to the issue of 
the domination, oppression and exploitation of animals by animal product industries.  
 Animals and Discourse 
One of the main reasons that animals are excluded from discussions of language 
and power is that they are not, themselves, participants in their own social construction 
through language. Because of the Marxist roots of Critical Discourse Analysis, analysis 
focuses on hegemony, where oppression of a group is carried out ideologically rather 
than coercively, through the manufacture of consent (Fairclough 1992:92). In the case 
of animals, the power is completely coercive, carried out by a small number of people 
involved in organisations which farm and use animals. The animals do not consent to 
their treatment because of ‘false consciousness’ generated through ideological 
assumptions contained in discourse.  
However, the coercive power used to oppress animals depends completely on 
the consent of the majority of the human population, who explicitly or implicitly agree 
to the way animals are treated every time they buy animal products. This consent can be 
withdrawn, as has been demonstrated through boycotts of veal, battery farm eggs, 
cosmetics tested on animals, and, by some, all animal products. It is in the 
manufacturing of consent within the human population for the oppression and 
exploitation of the animal population that language plays a role. 
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Shotter (1993) uses the term ‘rhetorical-responsive’ to describe the way that 
social constructions exist not in the minds of individual people, but within the constant 
interaction and exchange of information in a society. Within American society there is 
what Kopperud (1993:20) calls ‘a pitched battle for the hearts and minds of US 
consumers’ taking place between the meat industry and animal activists. This 
ideological struggle occurs primarily through language and the media. Jones (1997:73), 
for example, found that ‘Public opposition to both the use of animals in scientific 
research and the killing of animals for fur increased significantly following the high 
level of media coverage given…’ 
The way that animals are socially constructed influences how they are treated by 
human society: ‘cultural constructs determine the fate of animals’ as Lawrence 
(1994:182) puts it. These ‘cultural constructs’ are intimately bound up with language 
and discourse. According to Fairclough (1992:64), discourse ‘is a practice not just of 
representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the 
world in meaning.’ From this perspective, discourse can be considered a way of talking 
and writing about an area of knowledge or social practice which both reflects and 
creates the structuring of the area.  
Van Dijk (1997) considers the link between discourse and society to be through 
ideology and social cognition. The term ‘ideology’ has been used in many different 
ways by different authors. One of the classic senses of ideology is a mode of thought 
and practice ‘developed by dominant groups in order to reproduce and legitimate their 
domination’ (ibid:25). One of the ways this is accomplished is ‘to present domination as 
‘God-given, natural, benign [or] inevitable’ (ibid:25). In Van Dijk’s more generalised 
sense, this is just one kind of ideology, where ideologies are ‘shared self-definitions of 
groups that allow group members to co-ordinate their social practices in relation to other 
groups’ (ibid:26).  
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Rather than explicitly encouraging oppression and exploitation, ideology often 
manifests itself more effectively by being implicit. This is achieved by basing discourse 
on assumptions which are treated as if they were common sense, but which are, in fact, 
‘common sense assumptions in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power’ 
(Fairclough 1989:84).   
Ideologies, embedded and disseminated through discourse, influence the 
individual mental representations of members of a society, which in turn influence their 
actions. These mental representations are part of what Van Dijk (1997:27) calls ‘social 
cognition’, since they are shared among members of a society through participation in 
and exposure to discourse. In the end, it is this social cognition which will influence 
which animal products people buy, how the meat industry treats animals, and whether 
people actively campaign against the oppression of animals.  
Data 
Animals play many roles in human society, including the roles of companion, 
entertainer, food item and commodity. There are therefore numerous discourses and 
ideologies which influence how they are socially constructed. The emphasis in this 
paper is on discourses which have a direct impact on the welfare of large numbers of 
animals, particularly discourses related to large-scale animal product utilisation.  
A corpus of data was collected from a variety of different sources, all of which 
were publicly available and therefore potentially influential. The corpus consists of: a) 
articles from ‘internal’ meat industry magazines such as Poultry and Meat Marketing 
and Technology, b) articles written by the meat industry for external reading, e.g., 
justifying farming methods and c) professional articles written by interested parties such 
as veterinarians specialising in food animals, or lawyers involved in the defence of 
product manufacturers. 
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In addition to the specialist discourses which appear in the corpus, mainstream 
discourse is also discussed. The data for this comes from personal observation and 
consultation of general dictionaries, idiom dictionaries and grammar books.  
 
Methodology 
The method used to analyse the data is a form of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) (Chilton and Schäffner 1997, Van Dijk 1993, Fairclough 1992, 1989, Fowler 
1991, Hodge and Kress 1993), combined with Potter’s (1996) theory of fact 
construction.   
CDA provides ‘an account of the role of language, language use, discourse or 
communicative events in the (re)production of dominance and inequality’ (Van Dijk 
1993:282). It does this by performing detailed linguistic analysis of discourses to expose 
the ideologies embedded within them. 
Chilton and Schäffner (1997:226) provide an explicit methodology for CDA, 
aimed at ‘interpretively linking linguistic details…to the strategic political functions of 
coercion, resistance, opposition, protest, dissimulation, legitimisation and 
delegitimisation’. The methodology they present echoes that of Fairclough (1992,1989) 
in focusing on the analysis of linguistic features such as vocabulary, grammar, textual 
structures, and punctuation in order to reveal hidden ideological assumptions on which 
discourse is based.  
This process of revealing ‘common sense’ assumptions can be important 
because, as Fairclough (1989:85) writes, ‘If one becomes aware that a particular aspect 
of common sense is sustaining power inequalities at one’s own expense, it ceases to be 
common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities.’  
The following discussion, based on detailed analysis of the data mentioned 
above, is aimed at answering the following question: How does language, from the level 
 7 
of pragmatics and semantics down to syntax and morphology, influence the way that 
animals are socially constructed, and hence treated, by human society?  
 
Discussion 
Mainstream discourse 
Singer (1990:vi) describes the way that ‘The English language, like other 
languages, reflects the prejudices of its users’. The example he gives is of the word 
‘animal’ which, in contrast to its use in scientific discourse, often excludes human 
beings from its semantic extension. It is quite usual to talk about ‘animals and people’, 
or to say ‘there are no animals here’ when there are, in fact, people. This semantic 
classification can contribute to oppression by reproducing ‘outgroup social 
psychology…which distances us from, and prevents us from seeing, animal suffering’ 
(Shapiro 1995:671).  
Other linguistic mechanisms which distance us from animal suffering occur at 
the lexical level: ‘The very words we use conceal its [meat’s] origin, we eat beef, not 
bull…and pork, not pig…’ (Singer 1990:95). We also wear leather made from hide, not 
skin, and eat a carcass, not a corpse. As Shapiro (1995:671) points out ‘We do not say 
“please pass the cooked flesh”’: meat is meat, with quite different connotations from 
circumlocutions with the same meaning such as ‘bits of the dead bodies of animals’.  
The shock value of such circumlocutions was exploited by the BBC news during the 
‘BSE crisis’ when reporting the fact that cattle were being fed ‘mashed up cows’.  
Killing, too, is lexicalised differently for humans and animals: animals are 
slaughtered, humans are murdered. Interchanging these two: You murdered my pet 
hamster is comical, The refugees were slaughtered means they were killed brutally, 
uncaringly and immorally.  
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Animals are not only represented in language as different, but also as inferior, 
the two conditions necessary for oppression. Conventional metaphors, which Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) claim have a strong influence on our everyday thinking, are 
overwhelmingly negative to animals. Examples are: you greedy pig, ugly dog, stupid 
cow, bitch, you are so catty, crowing over your achievements, you chicken, stop 
monkeying around, you big ape (see Leach 1964, Palmatier 1995). These examples 
contain nouns, adjectives as well as verbs which have all become polysemous through 
metaphorical extension in ways negative towards animals. The use of animal names as 
insults is based on, and reproduces, an ideology in which animals are considered 
inferior.  
Idioms which refer to animals also tend to describe negative situations, or 
contain images of cruelty. Consider dogs: sick as a dog, dying like a dog, dog's dinner, 
it's a dog’s life, working like a dog, going to the dogs. And cats: cat on hot bricks, not 
enough room to swing a cat, a cat in hell’s chance, running like a scalded cat. And 
larger animals: flogging a dead horse, the straw that broke the camel’s back, talking the 
hind legs of a donkey. The only positive animal idioms seem to be idioms describing 
wild birds and insects, for example: an early bird, in fine feather, feathering your nest, 
being as free as a bird, happy as a lark, wise as an owl, and snug as a bug in a rug, 
chirpy as a cricket, as fit as a flea, the bees knees. There are exceptions to this pattern, 
but the pattern is clear: the closer the relation of dominance of a particular species by 
humans, the more negative the stereotypes contained in the idioms of mainstream 
discourse.  
The ideological positioning of animals extends into syntax as well. When 
animals die they change from being objects to substance, count nouns to mass nouns, in 
a way that humans do not. It is quite possible to say ‘some chicken’, ‘some lamb’, or 
‘some chicken leg’, but ‘some human’ and ‘some human leg’ are ungrammatical. Singer 
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(1990:95) is surprised that while we disguise the origin of pig meat by calling it pork, 
we ‘find it easier to face the true nature of a leg of lamb’. However there is a clear 
grammatical difference here: we cannot say ‘a leg of person’, instead we say ‘a person’s 
leg’. Expressing the lamb example similarly (e.g., ‘Tonight we are going to eat a lamb’s 
leg’), does not hide the origin in the same way. 
Another place where animals change from count nouns to mass nouns is on 
safari. Whether the participants are carrying guns or cameras, the way of talking about 
animals is the same: they say we saw giraffe, elephant and lion, instead of we saw 
giraffes, elephants and lions. Using mass nouns instead of count nouns removes the 
individuality of the animals, with the ideological assumption that each animal is just a 
(replaceable) representative of a category. Lawrence (1994:180) writes that ‘If there are 
no differences among members of a group, their value and importance are greatly 
diminished so that it is easier to dislike them and to justify their exploitation and 
destruction.’  
Pronoun use can lead to the kind of ‘us’ and ‘them’ division similar to that found 
in racist discourse, with ‘us’ referring to humans and ‘them’ to animals. Even in the 
animal rights literature the pronouns we, us and our are almost always used exclusively, 
i.e., referring only to humans. Perhaps the strongest animal rights campaigner of all, 
Tom Regan (1996:37), writes ‘We want and prefer things…our enjoyment and 
suffering…make[s] a difference to the quality of our lives as lived…by us as 
individuals.’ This appears to be an inclusive use of us, we and our, until the next 
sentence is read: ‘[T]he same is true of…animals…’  
The common way of referring to animals as ‘it’ rather than ‘him’ or ‘her’ 
objectifies them. Objects can be bought, sold and owned, a lexical set used routinely 
used in everyday conversation when talking about animals. This reveals the ‘common 
sense’ assumption that animals are property. It is semantically deviant to talk about 
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someone ‘owning’ another human, unless the term is used metaphorically, when it 
refers to immoral and unfair domination.  
Spender’s (1998) book Man Made Language shows how mainstream discourse, 
evolving in a male-oriented society, both reflects and reproduces bias against women. In 
the same way, it is not surprising to find that discourse evolving in a predominantly 
meat eating culture reflects negative attitudes towards animals. The extent to which this 
influences people to condone exploitation is uncertain, but mainstream discourse is 
reinforced by the discourses of groups which have ideological interests in justifying the 
utilisation of animals. 
 
The discourse of the animal products industries 
One type of ideology, as mentioned above, presents oppression as being ‘God-
given, natural, benign, [or] inevitable’ (Van Dijk 1997:25). Oppression of animals is 
often justified quite literally as ‘God given’ through the much quoted verse from 
Genesis (1:28) where God gives humans ‘dominion’ over animals. The animal products 
industry, however, does not use the discourse of religion. Instead the discourse of 
science, among others, is used to make oppression appear natural and inevitable (see 
Sperling 1988).  
The discourse of evolutionary biology is often invoked to equate the intensive 
farming and slaughter of animals with the behaviour of predators in the wild, in order to 
make it appear ‘natural’. Linguistic devices are used to accomplish this, as can be seen 
in the article ‘The natural wrongs about animal rights and animal liberation’ by Randall 
S. Ott, a specialist in the industry-relevant field of bovine reproduction.  
After explicitly declaring ‘people are animals’, Ott’s (1995) article uses 
collocations such as ‘the human animal’, and ‘animals other than human beings’ 
(p1023-4) to emphasise a semantic classification in which, unlike mainstream discourse, 
 11 
humans are included in the category ‘animals’. This goes as far as directly including 
humans in the semantic category of ‘predator’: 
1) The natural relationship between predator and prey is congruent with neither an 
egalitarian or an animal rights viewpoint. (p1024) 
2) Predator-prey relationships and a hierarchical utilisation of other beings, alive and 
dead, is essential to nature. (p1024) 
 
This treats as ‘common sense’ the assumption that what applies to the (non-
human) animal situation of predation is the same as that which applies to the human 
situation. However, prototypical members of the category ‘predators’ are lions and 
tigers, and humans are non-prototypical members (see Rosch 1975). This deliberate 
inclusion of non-prototypical members (humans) in general statements about 
prototypical ones (lions) hides important differences between the situation of the lion 
hunting its prey (which no-one would argue is unethical) and intensive farming of 
thousands of animals in cramped conditions. Differences, such as the fact that lions 
benefit the gene pool of their prey whereas selective breeding for meat quantity 
damages it, are conveniently hidden.  
Potter’s (1996:112-115) investigation of fact construction shows how claims to 
scientific objectivity are used to ‘work up the facticity of a version’. This can be seen in 
Ott’s case, where his claims are presented as ‘biological principles’, ‘biological rules’, 
and ‘scientific knowledge’ based on ‘biological evidence’ (pp1023-1025), while the 
animal rights movement’s claims are ‘beliefs’, ‘fantasies’, ‘philosophical musings’, 
‘dogma’, ‘the wrong view’ and ‘false’ (pp1023-1029). Hedges such as ‘might be’, 
‘probably’ or ‘can be seen as’ are almost never used in Ott’s article. Instead the 
modality throughout the paper is one which presents what is being talked about as, to 
use Potter’s (1996:112) words, ‘solid, unproblematic, and quite separate from the 
speaker’.  
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While the discourse of evolutionary biology presents animal oppression as 
‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’, different discourses use different semantic classifications to 
make it appear ‘benign’: 
 
Modern animal housing is well ventilated, warm, well-lit, clean and 
scientifically designed…Housing protects animals from predators, disease 
and bad weather… Animal Industry Foundation (from Harnack 1996 p130) 
 
Here the semantic extension of predators does not include human predators, 
such as the farmer, who the housing offers no protection from. This ‘ontological 
gerrymandering’ (Potter 1996:186) makes wild animals seem to be the enemy of 
animals, with humans their protectors. As Garner (1998:463) points out ‘Agribusiness 
interests often disguise the grim realities of factory farming and proclaim their concern 
for animal welfare.’ This can be seen in the language used in the quotation above. The 
euphemism ‘housing’ is used in place of cage, and the five positive qualities of the 
‘housing’ are expressed directly after each other in a list, a grammatical pattern used by 
estate agents describing a desirable residence.  
Like many of the properties described by estate agents, there are alternative, less 
euphemistic ways of describing the same accommodation. For example, compare 
‘Modern animal housing is…well-lit’ with ‘Crammed into tiny cages with artificial 
lighting…’ (Trans-species unlimited, from Harnack 1996:136), and compare ‘well 
ventilated, warm, …clean’ with ‘the heat mixed with the ammonia and dust in the 
houses causes incredible health problems.’ (Bowers 1997a). 
Even punctuation is used for ideological ends, as the example from a dairy 
industry journal below shows: 
 
people concerned about animal welfare…may have seen a sensational news 
story about the abuse of animals or about “factory farms.” (Knowlton and 
Majeskie 1995:449) 
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Here the use of inverted commas is intended to try to distance intensive farming from 
the image of a factory. 
While the ‘external’ discourse of animal industries presents the treatment of 
animals as benign, ‘internal’ discourse has a different ideological objective. Here the 
aim seems to be to encourage workers to neglect suffering and focus on profit. Fiddles 
(1991:200) describes the way that the meat industry ‘regards care for their animal raw 
materials as little more than a commercial oncost’. An indication of this can be found in 
the archives of the industry magazines Poultry and Meat Marketing and Technology 
(available at http://mtgplace.com/meatingplace/Archives). Within these archives, items 
in the lexical set ‘pain, suffering, hurt(ing)’ [with reference to animals] are mentioned in 
3, 2 and zero articles respectively. On the other hand, items in the lexical set ‘money, 
financial, profit’ are mentioned in 224, 101 and 90 articles respectively. 
Hidden assumptions which make the suffering of animals appear unimportant 
can be found in the linguistic devices used in the discourse of the meat industries. One 
of these devices is metonymy, which is, according to Lakoff (1987:77) ‘one of the basic 
characteristics of cognition’. Examples are as follows (emphasis added): 
 
(a) Catching broilers is a backbreaking, dirty and unpleasant job. (Bowers 1997a) 
(b) [there is] susceptibility to ascites and flipover…in the female breeder (Shane 1995) 
(c) There’s not enough power to stun the beef…you’d end up cutting its head off while 
the beef was still alive. (Slaughterhouse worker interviewed in Eisnitz 1997:216) 
(d) Exciting times for beef practitioners (written by veterinarian, Herrick 1995:1031) 
 
In (a) live birds are named and referred to by a cooking method, in (b) by their 
function, in (c) cows are referred to by their dead flesh, and in (d) veterinarians 
specialising in bovine medicine are called ‘beef practitioners’ rather than ‘cow 
practitioners’. All of these ways of referring to animals focus attention away from their 
individuality, and contribute to what Regan (1996:35) calls ‘the system that allows us to 
view animals as our resources.’ 
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The discourse of resources is frequently used in direct reference to live animals 
as well as dead ones. Examples are the word damage instead of injury in the expression 
‘bird damage’ (Bowers 1997b), product instead of bodies in ‘product is 100 percent 
cut-up and hand deboned’ (Bowers 1997b), and destruction and batch in ‘Isolation of 
salmonella will result in the destruction of the flock…[or] slaughter of the batch’ 
(Shane 1995). The discourse of resources includes metaphors too, from dead metaphors 
such as ‘livestock’ to novel metaphors such as the ANIMALS ARE PLANTS metaphor 
evident in ‘an automatic broiler harvesting machine’ (Bowers 1997a) and ‘How hogs 
are handled before stunning and harvesting has plenty to do with the quality of meat’ 
(Proper 1995, emphasis added).  
Since inanimate resources cannot suffer, the discursive constriction of animals 
as resources contributes to an ideology which disregards suffering. When events which 
include suffering are described and talked about, nominalisation is frequently used to 
hide agency (see Fairclough 1989:124). An example of this is: 
  
(e) Catcher fatigue, absenteeism and turnover can effect broken bones and bruises that 
reduce processing yields. (Bowers 1997a)  
 
This sentence describes incidents where animals are injured. But the actual 
animals are not mentioned at all. This is accomplished through the nominalisations 
broken bones  (‘X breaks Y’s bones’) and bruises (‘X bruises Y’), which allow the 
patient, Y, to be deleted. The agent, X, in this case the ‘catcher’, is also deleted, 
appearing only indirectly as a modifier in the noun phrase ‘catcher fatigue’, which 
forms part of the agent of the verb ‘effect’ rather than ‘break’. This distances deliberate 
human action from animal injuries. In addition, the results of the injuries are not 
mentioned in terms of pain or suffering, but in terms of ‘yields’. The same pattern can 
be seen in sentence: 
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(f) Carcass damage from handling and bird struggle during the kill does occur in 
broilers (Bowers 1997b). 
 
There are three nominalisations here: ‘damage’ (X damages Y), ‘handling’ (X 
handles Y) and ‘the kill’ (X kills Y). These three hide both the agent and the patient, 
who appears only as a modifier in the expressions ‘bird damage’ and ‘bird struggle’. In 
addition, the resultant injuries to what are clearly live, struggling animals are expressed 
in terms of damage to the dead ‘carcass’.  
Singer (1990:50) points out that ‘detachment is made easier by the use of 
technical jargon that disguises the real nature of what is going on’. This can be seen in 
the following quote: 
 
(g) Perdigo’s Marau plant processes 4.95-pound broilers at line speeds of 136 bpm, 
running 16 hours per day… Perdigo previously used a stunning method more 
similar to US standards: 45 mA/bird (60hz) for a seven second duration with water 
bath. However, these stunning parameters induced pectoral muscle contraction that 
resulted in blood splash. (Bowers 1997b) 
 
Here birds become units in the mathematically expressed parameters ‘136 bpm’ (birds 
per minute) and 45 mA/bird. And it is these ‘stunning parameters’ which are the agent 
of the verb ‘induced’. Thus responsibility for causing convulsions so strong they cause 
bleeding is being placed on parameters rather than on the electrocution itself, or the 
people instigating it.  
One final linguistic device which can be used to encourage the disregard of 
animal suffering is extended metaphor, which, as Johnson (1983) shows, can influence 
reasoning patterns. The following is a famous example of a meat industry metaphor:  
 
(h) The breeding sow should be thought of as, and treated as, a valuable piece of 
machinery whose function is to pump out baby pigs like a sausage machine (in 
Coats 1989:32) 
 
This encourages metaphorical reasoning along the lines of ‘machines do not 
have feelings’ therefore ‘pigs do not have feelings’ and ‘valuable machines should be 
utilised as much as possible’ therefore ‘pigs should be utilised as much as possible’. The 
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results of this reasoning pattern can be seen in Coats’s (1989:34) description of pig 
farming: ‘the sow must produce the maximum number of live piglets in the shortest 
time…No regard is paid for the distress and suffering caused by these continual 
pregnancies.’ 
 
Conclusion 
This paper analysed a number of materials using the methods of critical 
discourse analysis in an investigation of the connection between language, power and 
the oppression of animals. The ultimate aim of analyses such as this is, of course, not 
simply to describe relations of domination and exploitation, but also to challenge them. 
Fairclough’s (1992) Discourse and social change describes the way that dominant 
ideologies which reproduce and maintain oppression can be resisted, and social change 
can come about through opposing discourses.  
The animal rights movement, as it exists today, does provide a discourse which 
opposes oppression. Animal rights authors frequently counter the classifications of 
mainstream discourse by using terms such as ‘non-human animal’, ‘other-than-human 
animal’, and inclusive terms such as ‘being’ in ‘If a being suffers there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration’ (Singer 1990:8). This 
is the same ‘humans are animals’ semantic classification used in biological discourse to 
argue against animal rights. However, in this case the similarities drawn out are 
different, focusing on animals’ ability to suffer and feel pain in the same way that 
humans can.    
The animal rights movement is aware of the power of language, and makes 
deliberate attempts to change language, as the following examples show: 
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We chose [pets] and most likely bought them in a manner similar to the way 
in which human slaves were once…bought and sold…Keeping the term pets 
recognises this hierarchy of ownership… (Belk 1996) 
 
The blade is electrically heated and cauterises the blood vessels as it snips 
off about one fourth of the beak. The chicken industry characterises this 
procedure as “beak trimming” as if it’s little more than a manicure. (Marcus 
1998:103, emphasis in original) 
 
[when animals are considered to be ‘tools’] a certain callousness towards 
them becomes apparent. Consider, for instance, Harlow and Suomi’s 
mention of their “rape rack” and the jocular tone in which they report on the 
“favourite tricks” of the female monkeys…(Singer 1990:50) 
 
[about the term ‘road kill’] I do not believe that humans…should refer to 
innocent, defenceless victims…in such an insensitive, impersonal way…I 
believe that the term “road-kill” should be stricken from our vocabulary. 
(Appel 2000:8) 
 
However, these are all focused on individual words. This paper has attempted to 
show that it is not just individual words which contribute to the domination and 
oppression of animals. Instead language at all levels, from the morphological changes 
which create the metonymy ‘broiler’ from ‘broil’, through punctuation, semantic 
classification schemes, grammatical choices, pronoun usage, to metaphor are 
systematically related to underlying ideologies which contribute to maintaining and 
reproducing oppression.  
The external discourses of animal product industries contain hidden ideological 
assumptions which make animal oppression seem ‘inevitable, natural and benign’. The 
internal discourses encourage pain and suffering to be disregarded for the sake of profit. 
It is not, therefore, just at the level of words that animal activists can attempt to oppose 
discourses of oppression, but at all linguistic levels that make up discourse.   
Van Dijk (1993:253) describes the way that critical discourse analysts take the 
perspective of ‘those who suffer most from dominance and inequality…Their problems 
are…serious problems that effect the wellbeing and lives of many.’ In terms of the sheer 
number of sentient beings suffering, and the impact that intensive farming has on their 
lives from birth to slaughter, non-human animals also fit into this group. This paper has 
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attempted to show that language is relevant to the oppression of animals, and can be an 
appropriate area of research for critical discourse analysis.  
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